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 This study aims to determine the degree to which political separatism in Gorno-
Badakhshan threatens energy security in Central Asia. To answer this question, the study 
employs a modified ICRG method of measuring political risk. This framework measures six 
variables and assigns them a rating of either “low,” “medium,” or “high” according to their 
significance relating to either “energy significance” or “probability of political 
upheaval/conflict.” Such significance is determined according to the ICRG methodology, and a 
final rating is given for the significance political separatism in Gorno-Badakhshan has in 
affecting regional energy security. The result of this study found this rating to be a “medium” 
level, with two primary factors contributing to this coanclusion: an event of actualized political 
violence/widespread revolt in Gorno-Badakhshan would (1) pull Tajik security forces into a 
drawn-out conflict in the territory, leaving room for militants in western Tajikistan and northern 
Afghanistan to launch attacks on energy infrastructure in and near Tajikistan and (2), hinder the 
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 Central Asia is again at a crossroads, pulled between old and new powers. Its Soviet 
legacy is undeniable, from its authoritarian governments to its strong economic relationships 
with Moscow. However, the rise of Chinese commercial investment in the region, and the 
country’s massive expansion into new and proposed trade relationships with Central Asian 
republics, has seen rapid increases in Chinese regional influence. Much of this renewed interest 
in Central Asia concerns its vast reserves of untapped natural resources. Oil, natural gas, and 
uranium are increasingly sought by outside markets, and the governments of Central Asia have 
moved to increasingly meet this demand.  
 No more evident is this renewed competition than in Gorno-Badakhshan, a remote 
province of eastern Tajikistan. Occupying the southeastern-most corner of Central Asia, this 
territory serves as a microcosm in exhibiting greater regional issues, especially regarding energy 
security and this increased geopolitical competition between China and Russia. The significance 
of Gorno-Badakhshan regarding Central Asia’s energy security is partially due to its vast, 
untapped hydroelectric potential, and strategic location proximate to three of the region’s largest 
energy transport corridors. Two of China’s largest pipelines in Central Asia run less than 30 
miles from the territory’s borders, solidifying the unstable Gorno-Badakhshan as one of 
Beijing’s top security priorities in the region. Further, Gorno-Badakhshan is unique in that it 
operates at a distance from the control of the Tajik government, demonstrating a level of 
autonomy absent from any other territory in Central Asia. This autonomy is fueled by constant 
exercises of political separatism, from peaceful demonstrations to violent conflict. Such events 
are increasing in both frequency and intensity, raising concerns over their implications for 
greater Central Asian security and stability. These concerns over regional security, and especially 
energy security, are exacerbated by the emergence of a stronger, more internationally-connected 
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Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Together, these three issues of energy significance, political 
separatism, and emerging Afghan threats, are necessary to examine in the context of Gorno-
Badakhshan, not only to identify and assess threats to energy security within and promximate to 
the territory’s borders, but also to understand their implications for Central Asian security as a 
whole.  
Purpose, Research Question(s), and Definitions 
 This study combines two significant issues faced by Central Asia today, and its future 
prosperity and stability: political autonomy and energy security. These two issues are then 
examined in the context of one of Central Asia’s most volatile territories: Gorno-Badakhshan. 
Gorno-Badakhshan has never been examined regarding its significance to regional energy 
security, evidencing the relevance of this study.  
 The purpose of this study is to examine how the political separatism in Gorno-
Badakhshan affects regional energy security. Regional energy security refers to issues in the 
region of south-eastern Central Asia, which equates to territory within about 100 miles of Gorno-
Badakhshan’s borders. This distance was selected as it encompasses all of Tajikistan, western 
Uzbekistan, and southern Kyrgyzstan. This area is also home to about half of Central Asia’s 
entire population, and most of Chinese energy infrastructure in all Central Asia. This study will 
also differentiate issues of local and proximate energy security, “local” here referring to energy 
security issues within Gorno-Badakhshan’s borders, and “proximate” referring to territory within 
100 miles of its borders. 
  This study defines “energy security” as both the ability of governments and companies to 
extract and transport energy resources, and the ability of populations to maintain access to 
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constant, reliable sources of energy. It also refers to the development and assurance of new 
energy extraction, production, and transportation infrastructure.  
 This study defines “influence” and “significance” as the degrees to which energy 
resources and infrastructure in Gorno-Badakhshan (both current and proposed, and both local 
and proximate) impact local populations’ access to energy resources, and the ability of 
companies and governments to develop and maintain commercial energy projects. For example, 
if 9 hydropower plants supply all the electricity for Gorno-Badakhshan’s ~300,000 residents 
(which is the case), this infrastructure would be “highly” significant to Gorno-Badakhshan’s 
local energy security. If a single pipeline carried 35% of China’s imported liquid natural gas 
from Turkmenistan (which is the case), this infrastructure would also be “highly” significant to 
energy security in territories promximate to Gorno-Badakhshan. Significance must be present in 
both proximate and local capacities for resources and infrastructure to be considered “regionally” 
significant.  
 These definitions considered, this study’s research question is comprised of three parts, 
all inextricably linked in determining how political separatism in Gorno-Badakhshan affects 
regional energy security:  
 (a) What is the influence/significance of energy resources and infrastructure, local and 
 proximate to Gorno-Badakhshan, on regional energy security?   
 (b), what level of threat does political separatism and extremism in Gorno-Badakhshan 
 pose to this regional energy security?  
 and 





 Though energy resources are foundational in the creation and maintenance of every 
society, the term and study of “energy security” is recent phenomenon. The variety of issues now 
understood as “energy security” have historically been absorbed into larger issues of 
infrastructure, trade, or oil supply. The first person to be widely associated with this new field 
was Daniel Yergin, who is still writing on topics on energy security today.   
 Yergin’s first foray into this subject was in 1979, when he co-authored Energy Future: 
The Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School. The report examined the 
energy crises of the 1970’s and made subsequent recommendations as to how the U.S. could 
increase its resilience to similar disasters. Yergin and his co-author, Robert Stobaugh, concluded 
that the U.S. needed to develop and deploy alternate sources of energy, and that, “the energy 
crises and price rises of 1973-74 and 1978-79 were not isolated instances but part of a ‘major 
transition’.”1 The report covers everything from the need to increase efficiency in automobiles, 
to projected domestic production rates of coal, oil, and natural gas. While several of the authors’ 
predictions, namely regarding the future production rates of natural gas, have since proven 
inaccurate, the piece was nonetheless a valuable contribution to this emerging field of study. Its 
core points, that the U.S. “cannot rely on one big technological fix to solve the energy problem”, 
and “American policy should foster a system of balanced energy sources,” are still universally 
echoed by many in the field today.2  
 While Daniel Yergin first foray in the energy security was in 1979, his most significant 
contribution to the field came in 1991 with his publishing of The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, 
                                                 
 1 William A. Mogel. “ENERGY FUTURE REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD 
BUSINESS SCHOOL.” Energy Bar Association, 1980. Pg. 1, Accessed September 25, 2018. https://www.eba-
net.org/assets/1/6/7-Vol2_No1_1981_Book_Review_Energy_Future_Repo.pdf 
 2 Ibid, 1980 
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Money, and Power.3 The Prize examines the history of petroleum production and utilization, and 
while it does well to give a broader, historical context to ideas of energy security, it’s its sequel 
that proves most valuable in the field. Twenty years after the publishing of The Prize, Yergin 
released The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World.4 While The Prize 
was a supplemental history of energy security, The Quest is a modern application of its 
principles. This later book examines issues of energy supply, shale gas development, climate 
change’s effect on energy security, and the new role of great powers on the international energy 
system. So exhaustive is his examination, that Yergin met criticism for the book’s length and 
arguable inaccessibility. Regardless, The Quest serves as one of the most comprehensive 
narratives of modern energy security.   
 Since Yergin laid the foundation for this topic area, the idea of “energy security” has 
been applied to everything from studies aimed at “redefining” national security5 6, to advocacy of 
environmentally-conscious technologies7. However, literature that examines energy security in 
Central Asia falls primarily into two categories. The first category approaches the subject from a 
business-driven, capital investment standpoint. In the same way political risk analysis is often 
pursued by those in the corporate world, and not in academia, much of the writings on energy 
security in Central Asia examine the subject in ways beneficial to those who may be interested in 
capital investments in the region’s energy sector. Chief among these analyses came from Felix 
Arteaga of the Elcano Royal Institute in 2010, in his piece Energy Security in Central Asia: 
                                                 
 3 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 2008)  
 4 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2012) 
 5 Jessica Tuchman Matthews. "Redefining Security." Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989): 162-77. 
doi:10.2307/20043906. 
 6 Richard H. Ullman. "Redefining Security." International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 129-153. 
https://muse.jhu.edu/  
 7 Xianguo Li. “Diversification and localization of energy systems for sustainable development and energy 
security.” Energy Policy 33, 17 (2005): 2237, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2004.05.002 
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Infrastructure and Risk (ARI). This study examines risks and threats associated with energy 
infrastructure in Central Asia, from events of terrorist attacks to ageing and ill-maintained energy 
transport technology.8 The second primary category examines the issue as a small piece of a 
greater, emerging geopolitical struggle. A multitude of literature has been devoted to the 
examination of Russian and Chinese competition over influence in Central Asia, especially over 
Central Asian energy resources. Energy security, then, has been examined through the lens of 
this competition, notably in Roy Allison’s piece Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia 
Policy9 and Dianne L. Smith’s piece Central Asia: A New Great Game?10 Other literature blends 
the two categories, such as Yeongmi Yun and Ki-cheal Park’s 2010 piece which balanced issues 
of capital investment with more academic examinations of historical and current Russian energy 
policy.11 
 Literature examining energy security in Tajikistan is drastically more limited, and in the 
case of Gorno-Badakhshan specifically, nearly non-existent, save for brief mentions in greater 
examinations of Tajikistan as a whole. Tajikistan’s most examined energy security topic relates 
to its vast water resources, and how water politics has been at the center of many of the region’s 
longest political disputes. At the center of these disputes is Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam, as its 
construction would limit the already strained water flow to downstream countries like 
                                                 
 8 Felix Artega. “Energy Security in Central Asia: Infrastructure and Risk (ARI).” Real Instituto Elcano, 
April 19, 2010. Accessed December 6, 2018. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122359/ARI1-
2010_Arteaga_Energy_Security_Central_Asia.pdf 
 9 Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy." International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 80, no. 2 (2004): 277-93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569242. 
 10 Smith, Dianne L. “Central Asia: A New Great Game?” Asian Affairs, vol. 23, no. 3, 1996, pp. 147–
175. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/30172401. 
 11 Yun, Yeongmi, and Ki-cheal Park. "CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIAN POLICIES IN ENERGY 
SECURITY TOWARD CENTRAL ASIA: FOCUSING ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTH STREAM 
PIPELINE." The Journal of East Asian Affairs 24, no. 2 (2010): 151-74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258217. 
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Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Sarah Lain and Raffaello Pantucci examine this energy issue, 
among others in the region, in their 2017 report Energy Security Issues in 
Central Asia and Beyond.12 This report mirrors other literature focused on Tajik energy security, 
which primarily comes from multinational and humanitarian organizations. These groups 
produce literature focused on Tajik energy security from a humanitarian development focus, 
examining strategies to improve access to cheap, uninterrupted energy for vulnerable 
populations.13 Such literature was notably produced by Energy Charter Secretariat in its 2013 
report on increasing energy access in Tajikistan, primarily for remote communities.14 Other 
reports have come from the United Nations, like in their 2012 case study Tajikistan: Energy 
Production and Consumption Sector. This study specifically focused on the effects climate 
change had on already strained energy systems in the country, and offered paths to mitigate such 
threats.15  
 For such a recently coined concept, energy security has undergone significant shifts in its 
conceptualization and discussion over the last forty years. Literature attempting to examine and 
define energy security, especially in the context of a specific region like Central Asia, have 
evolved commercial and academic understandings of the topic. 
 
                                                 
 12 Sarah Lain and Raffaello Pantucci. “Energy Security Issues in Central Asia and Beyond.” Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 2017. Accessed December 6, 2018. 
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201705_rusi_energy_security_issues_in_central_asia_and_beyond_lain_and_pantu
cci.pdf 
 13 Laldjebaev, Murodbek & J Morreale, Stephen & Sovacool, Benjamin & Kassam, Karim-Aly. (2018). 
Rethinking energy security and services in practice: National vulnerability and three energy pathways in Tajikistan. 
Energy Policy. 114. 39-50. 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.11.058. 
 14 “In-Depth Energy Efficiency Review TAJIKISTAN.” Energy Charter Secretariat, 2013. Accessed 
December 6, 2018. https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/IDEER/IDEER-Tajikistan_2013_en.pdf 
 15 Kosimbek Olimbekov. Tajikistan: Energy Production and Consumption Sector.” United Nations 





 To determine the potential effects political separatism in Gorno-Badakhshan has on 
regional energy security, this study will use a modified version of the PRS Group’s International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Framework.16 This framework was developed in 1980 to predict 
financial, economic, and political risk for commercial clientele concerned with international 
investments. As risk assessments have been traditionally born out of commercial necessity rather 
than academic curiosity, such methodologies place heavy emphasis on economic analysis and 
financial evaluation. This PRG methodology is no different. For the sake of this research study, 
then, the part of the PRG methodology only focused on political risk is modified and used. A 
strength of this methodology is that it was created for this purpose: “One advantage of the ICRG 
model is that it allows users to make their own risk assessments based on the ICRG model or to 
modify the model to meet their specific requirements.”17 The ICRG model assigns numerical 
values based on 22 variables, or “components,” (12 components for political risk, and 5 for both 
financial and economic risk) it understands as the greatest predictors of risk in a country. Each of 
these 22 components has 3 subcomponents which are assigned numerical values ranging from 0 
to 4, with 0 demarcating “very high risk” and 4 “very low risk.”  These values are then added, 
run through PRS’s proprietary software, and the resulting number indicates a “risk rating” for the 
country, with 0 demarcating the highest possible level of risk, and 100 the lowest possible level.   
  This study will modify the ICRG framework in two ways. The first modification to the 
ICRG framework concerns its numerical rating system. This system will have the original scales 
of 0-4 and 0-100 replaced instead by a rating of either “low,” “medium,” or “high” to demarcate 
                                                 
 16 “International Country Risk Guide Methodology.” The PRS Group. Accessed September 25, 2018. 
https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf 
 17 Ibid, pp. 1 
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significance. These three ratings will then be given a numerical equivalent of 1 (low), 2 
(medium), or 3 (high). Ratings combining two values will also be used, for example 
“medium/high” would equal a numerical rating of 2.5.  
 This modification to the numerical value system is meant to simplify the original 
formula, and account for lack of access to PRS’s proprietary software. However, the primary 
reason that necessitates this simplification is the extreme lack of data regarding Gorno-
Badakhshan generally. Much of this absent data is required to effectively employ the original 
ICRG framework, a problem that will be later addressed in more detail. This modification is also 
necessary given the inclusion of 2 new variables (Energy Significance: Resources and Energy 
Significance: Infrastructure) which have no equivalent in the original ICRG framework.  
 The second modification is that only the 12 variables of the ICRG’s political risk 
category will be utilized and modified. While the other two categories, economic and financial 
risk, are important to investors interested in conducting business in a given country, they are not 
for this study. These two categories include subcomponents like “Net International Liquidity as 
Months of Import Cover” and “Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP” which are either not 
entirely relevant to the purpose of this research study, or the information required to examine 
these subcomponents do not exist for a region as remote and understudied as Gorno-Badakhshan. 
The exclusion of these two categories is not to suggest they bear no influence on political risk, 
and ICRG mitigates this by including socioeconomic subcomponents in their 12 political risk 
components. Further regarding these 12 components, this study will combine and exclude several 
of these variables to end with 6 instead of 12, the first 2 measuring “Energy Significance,” and 
the other 4 measuring “Probability of Political Upheaval.” These 6 variables have 3 
corresponding sub-variables. Though these-sub variables will not be given a rating (as is the case 
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in the original framework), they are stated to further explain the focus of the “parent” variable. 
The full list is as follows: 
Energy Significance 
  
Probability of Political Upheaval/Violence  
 
Excluded variables found in the original ICRG framework include “Investment Profile” which, 
“is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other 
political, economic and financial risk components”18 and includes subcomponents like “Payment 
                                                 
 18 Ibid, pp. 3 
2. Energy Significance: Resources 
 1. Amount of resources currently  
 being produced 
 2. Size of resource reserve/potential 
 3. Resources in terms of monetary  
 value/ export percentage 
1. Energy Significance: Infrastructure  
 1. # of natural resource extraction  
 facilities  
 2. # of proximate/immediate pipelines,  
 railways, transit routes 
 3. Potential/planned infrastructural  
    development 
1. Ethnic, Religious, and Social Tension  
 1. Minority discrimination and inequality  
 (both illegal and sanctioned)  
 2. Ethnic diaspora/distribution outside of  
    home region 
 3. Events of actualized ethnic violence 
 
2. Regional Leadership/Power Structures 
 1. Corruption 
 2. Local control vs. central government  
     control 
 3. Support of political     
     separatism/separatist  
     movements 
3. Actualized Political Conflict 
 1. Role of central governments in  
     regional affairs 
 2. Past clashes, violence with  
     central government   
 3. Past and current political  
     separatist movements, moves  
     toward greater autonomy 
4. Vulnerability to Foreign-born Extremism   
 1. Groups in Afghanistan with regional 
 interest/ties 
 2. Physical proximity to Afghanistan  
 3. Potential of extremists returning home  




delays” and “Profits Repatriation.” Again, this component might be helpful for an investor or 
financial group in determining the viability of a proposed project, but not necessarily for 
determining the chance of political upheaval or violence. Other components like “Ethnic 
Tensions” and “Religious Tensions” were combined as the two are inextricably linked in Gorno-
Badakhshan, with certain ethnic groups almost always belonging to the same religious sects, and 
vice versa.  
 The 4 components used in the “Probability of Political Upheaval/Violence” group (The 4 
political risk variables created from the original 12), were selected based on both availability of 
information and according to issues specifically relevant to Gorno-Badakhshan. Again, as is the 
case with “significance” in relation to energy resources and infrastructure, “significance” in 
relation to these 4 variables refers to how they contribute to the “Probability of Political 
Upheaval/Violence.” Their ratings, that range from low to high, refer to the extent to which they 
impact this probability, chance of political upheaval/violence. As with the necessary 
simplification of the ICRG’s numerical value system, lack of available data on Gorno-
Badakhshan necessities some simplification of variables used. While the ICRG framework is a 
valuable base method in determining risk for a given country, it is less equipped at determining 
risk for territories within countries, especially when a territory is either understudied or 
information about it is deliberately suppressed by a country’s government. This is the case with 
Gorno-Badakhshan, as the remote territory is not only understudied, but the Tajik central 
government has also limited the ability of outside groups to facilitate the collection and analysis 
of demographic and economic data within the territory.  
 While the exact split between suppression of information or simple under-examination is 
unknown, what is apparent is that there is a significant lack of data concerning Gorno-
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Badakhshan that would be necessary for completing a standard ICRG political analysis of the 
territory. Further justifying modification and simplification of the original framework is the 
existence of issues more relevant to understanding political upheaval in Gorno-Badakhshan than 
other areas of the world. For example, “Regional Leadership/Power Structures” was created as a 
component because it encapsulates perhaps the single largest source of political tension in the 
territory: the contest for territorial power and influence between the Tajik central government 
and local warlords. This component combines several ICRG base components like “Corruption” 
and “Government Stability” by either specifically assigning them as a subcomponent, or 
discussing them in the component’s data section. Other components were created to meet both 
needs, of topic relevance and organizational simplification. New components like “Actualized 
Political Conflict” and “Vulnerability to Foreign-born Extremism” combine ICRG base 
components of “External Conflict,” “Internal Conflict,” and “Military in Politics” for this reason.  
 To determine if a variable earns a low, medium, or high rating, this study will employ the 
same method for determining variable values as the ICRG does: “The political risk assessments 
are made [by their experts and staff] on the basis of subjective analysis of the available 
information…”   Once ratings are determined for all 6 variables, the corresponding numerical 
values will be added, and the mean of this addition will then be determined to assign a final 
rating for “risk of political separatism in Gorno-Badakhshan on regional energy security.” This 
assessment will be supplemented by a discussion of potential future scenarios that contribute to 
this rating. 
Acknowledgment of Limitations 
 Though accurate risk forecasts exist, any prediction of risk is inherently speculative. A 
respected, long used methodology like the ICRG relies on “subjective analysis of available 
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information.”19 This study will support all inferences ultimately made about the level of risk or 
significance in the stated variables, but there is inherently no objective guarantee for their 
absolute validity.  
 The author of this study does not speak or read the languages used in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
meaning information that might prove valuable in determining risk and significance values are 
potentially excluded. Information and research regarding this region is also systematically 
suppressed given the often-strained relationship between local inhabitants and federal 
government. Restriction of available information is also compounded by the general lack of 
information, as latest assessments into demographic and economic information often date back to 
the USSR’s studies. This combination of factors means the author will make inferences and 




 Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), or simply “Gorno-Badakhshan,” is a 
region in eastern Tajikistan that comprises 45% of the country’s total area, but only 3% of its 
population.21 Flanked by China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, and Afghanistan to the 
south, it is a region of immense strategic and political value, and one marred by a history of 
conflict and political instability. Comprised almost entirely of steep mountain ranges and high 
plateaus, the region was a stronghold for rebel groups fighting the Tajik government during the 
Tajik Civil War in the mid-1990s. GBAO is only accessible to the rest of the country via a single 
                                                 
 19 Ibid 
 20 Ibid 
 21 “Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO).” Oriental Express Central Asia, 2018. Accessed 
October 26, 2018. https://tajikistan.orexca.com/gorno_badakhshan_region.shtml 
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road, physically isolating the territory from the reach of the Tajik government. This isolation also 
extends ethnically and culturally, with GBAO’s population comprised mainly of ethnic Pamiris 
who follow Shia Ismailism, in contrast to western Tajikistan’s majority Tajik Sunni population. 
Such isolation and inaccessibility, coupled with a history and support of political separatism, 
means the Tajik government maintains very loose control over GBAO. This strained control has 
led to past conflicts between GBAO’s separatists and the central government, a problem that has 
been recently increasing in frequency and intensity.  
 
 
Map of Tajikistan 22 
1. Energy Significance: Resources  
Variable Rating: Medium (2.0) 
 Gorno-Badakhshan, though lacking more common Central Asian resources like oil and 
natural gas, offers a resource increasingly rare in the region: water. GBAO is occupied entirely 
by the Pamir Mountains which serve as a headwater for the region’s largest river, the Amu 
                                                 
 22 http://hitchhikershandbook.com/2015/09/15/gbao-permit-dushanbe-tajikistan/ 
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Darya. These mountains, and by extension all of GBAO, hold a largely untapped potential of 
hydropower. Tajikistan holds 4% of the world’s hydropower resources23 and 55% of Central 
Asia’s water resources. 24 Because no specific research has been conducted into the hydropower 
capacity/potential of GBAO alone, most analyses assume the number to be at least 45% of the 
country’s total amount. Understanding this, the hydropower potential of GBAO is at least 237.15 
billion kWh per year.25 Regarding installed potential, GBAO existing hydropower plants can 
produce over 370 million kWh of electricity annually. 26  
 Despite this enormous potential, the water resources of Tajikistan, and especially GBAO, 
are tapped at a much lower rate. The electricity generated in the entire country is only about 
6.5% of this potential, or 16-17 billion kWh.27 Despite this disparity, enough electricity is 
generated to meet customer demands. This abundance in electricity and generation potential has 
led to the country increasing energy exports in recent years. In 2016, Tajikistan exported over 
fifty million dollars’ worth of electricity to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, about 1.3 billion kWh 
which is 37% more than it exported in 2013.28 
 
 
                                                 
 23 “TAJIKISTAN: Accelerating Progress Toward the MDGs by Access to Energy.” United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010. Accessed October 1, 2018.  
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/MDG%20Acceleration%20Framework/MAF%20Reports/ECI
S/FINAL_MAF%20Report_Tajikistan_EN.pdf 
 24 Mette Nielsen. “Hydropower development and poverty reduction: The case of foreign investments in 
Tajikistan.” Copenhagen Business School, March 3, 2009. Pg. 32. Accessed October 1, 2018. 
 25 “Country Profile: Tajikistan.” International Hydropower Association, August 2015. Accessed October 1, 
2018. https://www.hydropower.org/country-profiles/tajikistan 
 26 “Research study for the Republic of Tajikistan within the framework of the project "The use of clean, 
renewable and / or alternative energy technologies for rural areas in Central Asia.” United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2014. Accessed October 1, 2018. https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/project-
monitoring/5-sustainable-energy/E234/2014_NationalStudies/TJ/TJ_Report.pdf 
 27 Nielsen, 2009 
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2. Energy Significance: Infrastructure  
Variable Rating: Medium (2.0) 
 There exists a diversity of energy infrastructure in, and proximate to, Gorno-Badakhshan. 
Within GBAO’s borders, the primary energy infrastructure centers around hydropower plants 
(HPPs). Almost all the region’s electrical consumption comes from hydropower, and though 
residents around the capital city of Dushanbe enjoy near-uninterpreted access to this electricity, 
those living in GBAO have historically experienced constant disruptions. The Aga Khan Fund 
for Economic Development (AKFED), along with several other multinational organizations and 
NGOs, remedied this problem starting in 2002. The groups founded Pamir Energy, a utility 
company that assumed control over GBAO’s energy generation and transmission infrastructure 
from the Tajik government. Though the federal government still technically controls the 
company, AKFED effectively governs the entire operation. Since Pamir Energy’s creation the 
AKFED has invested $37 million in repairing and expanding the region’s infrastructure. Pamir 
Energy has installed 9 HPPs and 13 electrical substations, and over 1000 kilometers of 
transmission lines. This effort has brought electricity to 96% of GBAO’s population, and has 
expanded to begin exporting electricity to neighboring communities in Afghanistan.29  
 Pamir Energy has two more HPPs and one more substation planned for development, but 
the most significant future projects it is implementing is expanded electrical transmission to 
customers in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan. Transmission of GBAO-generated electricity 
already serves almost 30,000 people in northern Afghanistan, a number Pamir Energy hopes to 
quintuple by 2020.30 Though Gorno-Badakhshan contains a significant amount of energy 
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infrastructure within its borders, it is the region’s proximity to external energy infrastructure that 
is more significant. Three primary corridors to the region’s west, north, and east contain energy 
infrastructure, both established and proposed, that is consequential to current and future issues of 
regional energy security. 
 Directly east of GBAO lies the Rasht Valley, a rift running north-east from Tajikistan’s 
capital to the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. This valley is where the final leg of the Turkmen-Chinese gas 
pipeline is currently being built, an infrastructure project ten years in the making. This “Line D” 
will run from Turkmen gas fields, through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, across western 
China, and end in the country’s populated east. This Rasht Valley section of the pipeline 
completes the project, and increased Turkmenistan’s annual gas export capacity to China from 
55 billion cubic meters to 85 bn cu m.31  
 To the north of GBAO lies the Fergana Valley, Central’s Asia’s “heart” and where half of 
its 85 million residents live. The valley is split between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
and has historically been the source of political and ethnic tension between these three countries. 
The valley is varied in sources of value, from its strategic location to its productive agricultural 
land. It is also the source of over 20% of Uzbekistan’s oilfields and home to Central Asia’s 
largest oil refinery.32 The Fergana Refinery, located in the Uzbek city of Fergana at the south of 
the valley, currently has the capacity to produce 450,000 tons of refined oil annually33, and store 
up to 6 million tons.34 A new pipeline connecting the refinery to Khiva and Bukhara oilfields in 
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the south and west of the country is currently under construction. This pipeline, which will run 
north from Fergana to Angren35, will also allow Kazakh oil to be easily transported for 
refinement.36 Shipping oil to the Fergana Refinery had traditionally been done via rail lines 
running through Tajikistan, but this pipeline will allow for expanded access to oil and increased 
health of the regional petroleum market.37  
 
 
Map of Ferghana Valley 38 
 
 The southern rim of the Fergana Valley is Kyrgyzstan’s territory and the location of 
another proposed development that would build an energy network connecting Central Asia to 
South Asia. The Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-
1000) is an electrical grid that would span from Kyrgyzstan to the north to Pakistan in the 
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south.39 The primary goal of this $1.1 billion project40 is to export Kyrgyz and Tajik hydropower 
to Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, especially during summer months when excess energy 
is produced.41 The project represents another example of Central Asian countries’ exploration of 
new markets, and one of many new agreements between Central Asian states and their southern 
neighbors. CASA-1000 is also one of the first steps in creating the Central Asia-South Asia 
Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM), an ambitious bid to connect Central Asian energy 
resources to Indian markets.42 The section of this project connecting Kyrgyzstan to the rest of the 
countries runs the entire southern and eastern lengths of the Fergana Valley, and directly north of 




Map of Line D and CASA-1000 43 
 
                                                 
 39 “Projects & Operations: Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-
1000).” The World Bank, 2018. Accessed October 9, 2018. http://projects.worldbank.org/P145054?lang=en  
 40  “Tajikistan – Power Generation and Distribution.” United States Department of Commerce- 
International Trade Administration, October 3, 2015. Accessed October 1, 2018. 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Tajikistan-Power-Generation-and-Distribution 
 41 “Country Profile,” 2015 
 42   “Tajikistan – Power,” 2015 
 43 https://www.ft.com/content/ee5cf40a-15e5-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d 
20 
 
 To the east of Gorno-Badakhshan, a proposed project linking China to the Indian Ocean 
is moving through development. Part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the creation of the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is comprised of a series of projects 
connecting various aspects of the two countries’ economies. One such project is a pipeline that 
would connect the Chinese city of Kashgar to the Pakistani port city of Gwadar. This port city, 
and pipeline connecting it to China, would allow China to transport Middle Eastern oil (which 
constitutes over 50% of China’s oil imports) more easily to western China. To get oil to Urumqi, 
western China’s largest city, oil traditionally travels from Middle East to Shanghai, and then 
west, overland to Xinjiang province. This route spans over 6,000 miles, which the creation of the 
Kashgar-Gwadar pipeline would reduce it to 2,200 miles. This pipeline would have the capacity 
to transport over a million barrels of crude oil per day, and would equip China to fuel the 
massive expansion it is currently pursuing in the west of its country.44  
 
 
Map of the Gwadar-Kashgar Pipeline 45 
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Probability of Political Upheaval/Violence   
3. Ethnic, Religious, and Social Tension 
Variable Rating: Medium/Low (1.5)  
 A defining characteristic of Gorno-Badakhshan is that it is home to one the largest groups 
of Ismaeli Muslims in the world. This branch of Shia Islam only has approximately 15 million 
followers worldwide, 200,000 of which reside in GBAO.46 These followers, and the majority of 
GBAO’s population, are part of the Pamiri ethnic group. Populations of Pamiris also inhabit 
portions of Afghan Badakhshan and northern Pakistan, and this population of GBAO is distinct 
from the rest of Tajikistan. The west of the country, where about 97% of the populations resides, 
is mainly comprised of ethnic Tajiks. Unlike their Pamiri neighbors, Tajiks are primarily 
followers of Sunni Islam. This divide is furthered by distinction in language, where ethnic 
Tajiks’ native tongue is Tajik, and Pamiris speak a combination of Shughni, Sarikoli, 
Yazgulyam, and Wakhi.47 These differences in ethnicity, language, and religion have long been 
cited in support of Gorno-Badakhshan’s autonomy, and even independence, from the rest of 
Tajikistan. 
 These differences have led to discrimination against the Pamiri minority by the Tajik 
government. The government of Tajikistan has routinely denied the Pamiri ethnicity exists at all, 
maintaining that those populations in GBAO are ethnically Tajik. The government refuses to 
recognize this ethnicity on passports or official documents, nor are Pamiris allowed into military 
or law enforcement positions.48 Unofficial discrimination from ethnic Tajiks stems mainly from 
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differences in religion and culture. Compared to the Sunni Tajiks in the west of the country, Shia 
Pamiri are more socially liberal. Women are educated and do not where head coverings, and 
enjoy more employment and social freedoms compered to their Tajik counterparts.49 Pamiris 
face social discrimination through the denial of employment and perpetuation of beliefs that 
Pamiris are not “true” Muslims.50 
 While the Tajik government has enacted policies that discriminate against Pamiris, they 
have increasingly targeted ethnic Tajiks with other policies. Such policies have included barring 
anyone under the age of 18 from entering a Mosque, the outlawing of facial hair, and 
imprisonment of certain clerics and political parties.51 These policies, the government claims, are 
meant to curb radicalism, yet many understand them as convenient tactics at quelling 
opposition.52  
 While issues of Pamiri identity continue to draw division in Tajik society, the issue of 
unemployment stands to particularly threaten the country’s social stability. Over half of 
Tajikistan’s economy is tied to foreign remittances, making it the most remittance dependent 
country on Earth. In GBAO this is also the case, with both Pamiris and Tajiks leaving Tajikistan 
to find work in other countries. Russia serves as the primary destination for this migrant laborer, 
with as many as 40,000 Pamiris living in Moscow alone.53 Almost half of working age Tajik men 
are unemployed, a number feared to be greater in GBAO among Pamiri men. Over half the 
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country’s growing population is younger than 2554, adding to an environment already ideal for 
extremist thought and action to take root.  
4. Regional Leadership and Power Structures    
Variable Rating: High (3.0) 
 Current political structures and control in Gorno-Badakhshan took root during the Tajik 
Civil War. Lasting from 1993-1997, this war still influences much of how the Tajik government 
operates and prioritizes threats. The war was fought between the Russian and Uzbek-backed 
central government, and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) which was comprised of several 
groups from the Rasht Valley and GBAO. The war left almost 100,000 dead and 1.2 million 
displaced, and ended with the victory of the central government.55 Gorno-Badakhshan’s 
significance in this conflict was not only in its support of the UTO, but of its occupation from 
opposition forces after the war’s official end. Though the Tajik government claimed victory and 
one of its war-time leaders, Emomali Rahmon, was appointed as the new president, many in the 
UTO and other rebel groups fled to GBAO to regain strength. These rebel leaders are still 
pursued by the Tajik government, and continue to exert influence over this remote region.  
 Today, Gorno-Badakhshan is balanced between the control of the Tajik government and 
a regional “shadow” government. Though GBAO is designated as an autonomous region, this 
title “bestows no legal or practical privileges.”56 The region is technically not autonomous in any 
legal capacity, though realistically it operates beyond the Tajik government’s control at varying 
degrees. This shadow government is comprised of three or four figures, simply referred to by 
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locals as the “Authorities.” In a study conducted by the International Crisis Group earlier this 
year, the Authorities are described as, “men [that] participated in the civil war on the side of the 
UTO and, pursuant to the 1997 peace agreement, received senior posts in the police, border 
guards and security services. They style themselves as defenders of Pamiri traditions and culture 
and, given the suppression of political opposition, are virtually the  only actors who can claim to 
be protecting Gorno-Badakhshan’s separate regional identity.”57 ICG goes on, noting, “When all 
is quiet, the bosses compete for cross-border business. When the central government flexes its 
muscle, ‘they come together again’. If clashes erupt, the Authorities can muster dozens of 
unemployed youth from Khorog and its environs, in addition to their regular gunmen. They also 
mediate local disputes and help the needy, supplanting Dushanbe’s appointees, who are viewed 
as corrupt and dismissive of Pamiri traditions.”58 Part of the peace agreement signed at the 
conclusion of the Tajik Civil War was a policy dictating at least thirty percent of government 
positions would be held by UTO leaders. Unsurprisingly, the majority of these leaders were 
assigned to positions in GBAO, far from the Tajik government’s spheres of control.59 As ICG 
has found, however, this strategy to pacify rebel leaders has allowed them to continue to 
challenge the central government and maintain paramilitary capabilities. Though many of these 
officials still technically work for the central government, they effectively “ignore” its 
authority.60 
 Though many residents of Gorno-Badakhshan remain skeptical of the Authorities, the 
shadow government is largely preferred to Dushanbe’s rule. The criminality of GBAO’s 
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informal leadership is known to residents, from its involvement in the transnational drug trade to 
weapons smuggling. Despite this, the Authorities are also understood as “defenders of Pamiri 
culture,”61 and the only force capable of contesting the domineering central government. 
Memories of ethnic cleansing carried out by government forces against the Pamiris are still fresh 
in the mind of the populous,62 as is its currently perceived underrepresentation in the Tajik 
government.63 This informal leadership, despite its criminal enterprises, offers support and 
services to the region’s struggling population, “often [filling] in the gaps left by an underpaid, 
underfunded and under-skilled local administration.”64 Though the Authorities are far from 
benevolent rulers, most of GBAO’s population prefers their rule to that of Dushanbe.  
 While the Authorities exercise control over immediate, everyday activities in GBAO, a 
single figure holds greater influence over the population’s cultural and religious ideology. Aga 
Khan is a title held by Prince Shah Karim Al Hussaini, who is the spiritual leader of the Pamiri 
people. He is the head of the Ismaeli faith, and whose rule is respected by the majority of 
GBAO’s population.65 Aga Khan also funds a host of services throughout GBAO, include health, 
agriculture, energy, and infrastructure projects. His material and spiritual support of the Pamiri 
population is understood and tolerated, albeit skeptically, by the Tajik government. Age Khan 
allows the Tajik government to barely spend money to maintain the region’s infrastructure and 
social services. As Ismailism is a progressive sect of Islam, Dushanbe understands that the Aga 
Khan’s influence does not lead to extremism or militant recruitment, another reason for the Tajik 
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government’s acceptance of the religious ruler’s development efforts into GBAO. However, any 
challenge to the central government’s rule, even a positive or non-threatening one, still means 
Dushanbe regards the Aga Khan as a subverting force.66 The Tajik government has also 
demonstrated little hesitation to bar the Aga Khan’s development agency, the Aga Khan 
Development Foundation (AKDF), from operating in GBAO after times of conflict.67  
5. Actualized Political Conflict 
Variable Rating: Medium/High (2.5)  
 Politically motivated violence between government and separatist forces has occurred 
sporadically since the end of the Tajik Civil War. Incidents of violence has increased in recent 
years, starting in September 2010 with fighting in the Rasht Valley. This valley, which borders 
GBAO and served as a stronghold for the UTO during the Tajik Civil War, was the site of a 
month-long battle which left over 60 government soldiers dead.68 Government troops were 
deployed to the valley after 25 UTO members escaped from a Dushanbe prison and fled to 
Rasht. This prison break was conducted with the help of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), one of the region’s oldest militant groups.69 Violence in the Rasht Valley began when 
government forces were ambushed by the UTO and IMU, which left 28 soldiers dead. The 
ensuing battle also saw rebels down a government helicopter, until fighting eventually ceased 
later that October.70  
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 Two years after the events in Rasht came the worst fighting since the Tajik Civil War, 
this time within GBAO territory. The fighting occurred in and around Khorog, GBAO’s capital 
city, and claimed the lives of as many as 150 government troops.71 This battle started in July of 
2012 when the Tajik government sent forces into Khorog after the death of a local government-
appointed official, Abdullo Nazarov.72 Dushanbe suspected that the Authorities had a part in the 
official’s killing, and used the death to assert more overt control over the city.73 What transpired, 
however, was a routing of the government forces and their eventual retreat. The battle only lasted 
one day and was understood as a major victory for the Authorities, and has since given them 
more negotiating power with Dushanbe.74 This event solidified the Authorities’ power in the 
region, not only in the minds of the local populous but of Dushanbe. The central government 
understands that this event demonstrates the inevitable consequences of overt military action 
against the Authorities, making the prospect of Chinese cooperation in the region that much 
more attractive.75 
 Upheaval in Gorno-Badakhshan occurred again two years later, when government police 
detained the brother of a local warlord in Khorog. When residents tried to free the man from the 
town’s police station, police officers fired into a crowd, killing two. A riot ensued, and the police 
station and a government official’s office were burned down.76 The most recent event of 
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significant political violence came in 2015, when gunmen killed nine government security 
members in and around Dushanbe. In a similar move as militants did in 2010, they then retreated 
to the mountains, this time to nearby Romit Gorge. The ensuing battle left a total of twenty-five 
militants dead, and raised the number of government forces killed to fourteen.  
6. Vulnerability to Foreign-borne Extremism/Violence 
Variable Rating: Medium (2.0) 
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 Tajikistan’s long history of political instability, coupled with its almost 1,000-mile-long 
border with Afghanistan, has continually raised concerns over militant group incursions into the 





vulnerable country.78 This fear, however, is considered by some to be overstated, and instead the 
issue of domestic-borne political conflict is a more legitimate concern. 79 Regardless, recent gains 
by terror groups in Afghanistan with affiliations to similar groups in Tajikistan has once again 
raised this question, as has China’s expansion into the region. 
 Historically, the most powerful and widespread militant group in Central Asia is the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The terror group’s stated goals are to overthrow the 
governments of Central Asia, which it understands are ruled by apostates and not followers of 
“true” Islam, and to establish a Muslim caliphate in the region. Formed in the late 1990s, the 
group launched attacks against the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
between 1998 and 2002.80 Operating out of strongholds in Rasht Valley, Gorno-Badakhshan, and 
northern Afghanistan, the group fled to the Afghan-Pakistan border region of Waziristan after the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The IMU suffered heavy losses throughout early to late 
2000s, but still managed to maintain a presence in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. This presence was 
maintained, in part, by al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s support for the group. Throughout the last two 
decades, the IMU has fought and trained alongside Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Waziristan, 
until an offensive by the Pakistani Military forced many of the terror groups’ members farther 
back into Afghanistan. While the Pakistani Military was successful in killing a number of 
militants, an unintended consequence of the operation was the migration of thousands of fighters 
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to Afghanistan’s northern territories.81 The Tajik government now estimates there to be as many 
as 15,000 militants operating along Afghanistan’s northern border.82 
 A major setback for the IMU occurred in 2015, just as the group appeared to be back to 
its previous levels of strength. The rise of the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP), the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) Afghan branch, fractured the IMU into two distinct 
groups. This fracture initially occurred in June of 2015 when the then leader of the IMU, Usman 
Ghasi, pledged allegiance to ISIS and ISKP.83 Until then the IMU was allied with al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban, which were both at war with ISKP. In response, the Taliban killed Ghasi and over a 
hundred IMU fighters in a 2016 battle.84  
 Since this battle, more branches of the IMU have emerged, some loyal to ISKP and 
others to the Taliban. The only group to remain loyal to ISKP formed its Moawiya branch. This 
branch is one of two (the other being the Farooqi branch, made up primarily of Pashtun fighters) 
that make up the entirety of ISKP in Afghanistan, and is led by a former IMU commander. The 
Moawiya branch operates in northern Afghanistan and is comprised of ethnic Balochs, Tajiks, 
and Uzbeks. The Morwiya branch has also seen a recent influx of Uyghur fighters, both from the 
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) defectors and returning ISIS fighters from The Middle East.85 
                                                 
 81 Bruce Pannier. “Central Asian Militants Return to Northern Afghanistan.” Radio Free Europe/ Radio 
Liberty, May 12, 2015. Accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-central-asian-militants-
north-afghanistan/27011640.html 
 82 Jeremy Luedi. “Under the Radar: Tajikistan on track to be the next Afghanistan.” Global Risk Insights, 
March 19, 2017. Accessed October 4, 2018. https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/03/under-the-radar-tajikistan-on-
track-to-be-the-next-afghanistan/ 
83 Ibid 
 84 Uran Botobekov. “Central Asian Jihadists Under Al Qaeda’s And Taliban’s Strategic Ties – Analysis.” 
Eurasia Review, August 24, 2018. Accessed October 4, 2018. https://www.eurasiareview.com/24082018-central-
asian-jihadists-under-al-qaedas-and-talibans-strategic-ties-analysis/ 
 85 Sudha Ratan. “The Trump Administration’s New Afghan Problem: The Islamic State.” The Diplomat, 




 Other terror groups aligned with the Taliban include the Uzbek-majority Islamic Jihad 
Union (IJU), but most notable among these Taliban-allied groups is Jamaat Ansarullah (JA). JA 
is the only Tajik-borne international terrorist organization, and splintered from the IMU around 
2010. JA has carried out several attacks against Tajik government forces, but their most notable 
activities have been recruiting Tajiks to fight in Syria.86 However, JA is now understood to 
control the majority of former IMU fighters in Northeastern Afghanistan, and its Tajik leadership 
has effectively transformed the IMU from an Uzbek organization into a Tajik one. The loses the 
IMU incurred after the Taliban crushed Ghasi and his followers in 2016 threw the group into 
disarray. Rendered “a wandering group of militants in northern Afghanistan,”87 IMU fighters 
who wanted a renewed relationship with the Taliban primarily joined JA.88 The last Taliban-
allied group comprised of a core ethnicity is the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). This terror group 
is mainly comprised of ethnic Uyghurs, and has fought alongside the Talban for almost two 
decades.89 The group commands over 400 fighters in north-east Afghanistan and is one of the 
Taliban’s most trusted allies.90  
 Given the complexity of these ever-shifting alliances and ethnic makeups in 
Afghanistan’s terror groups, it is no surprise that, “[regional] governments frequently use the 
IMU as a catchall phrase for Islamists in Central Asia who would like to overthrow the regions' 
governments.”91 The group’s name is a “convenient label” that can distort how complicated and 
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variable the relationships between these groups are. In whatever way its fighters are divided, 
however, Afghan security officials maintain that there are as many as 6,000 IMU fighters still 
operating in Afghanistan, the majority of whom are located in the north of the country.92 The 
United Nations estimates this number is significantly smaller, stating about 500 to 1,000 IMU 
members are active in Afghanistan.93 These estimates, again, depend on how an “IMU fighter” is 
defined, evidencing that there is no clear consensus as to the IMU’s true strength in the country.  
 The variety of Afghan-based terror threats, both in the number of groups and in the 
diverse ethnicities of their members, pose significant emerging security concerns for the region.94 
These factors are exacerbated by the Taliban’s growing strength in northern Afghanistan. The 
north of the country has traditionally not been a Taliban stronghold. The group routinely fought 
battles with local warlords in the region throughout the 1990s, as the north’s populous was, and 
still is, made up of primarily non-Pashtun residents. These ethnic differences have been 
increasingly mitigated, as the traditionally Pashtun Taliban has seen the number of ethnic Tajiks 
and Uzbeks joining its ranks swell in recent years. This surge in Tajik and Uzbek recruitment has 
led to massive territorial gains along Tajikistan’s southern border, and a quarter of Taliban 
leadership is now comprised of non-Pashtun fighters. This shifting ethnic makeup has allowed 
the group to increase its foothold in northern Afghanistan, making the region now one of the 
Taliban’s core areas of power.95   
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 Though the Taliban has effectively contested much of ISKP’s actions in northern 
Afghanistan, evolving relationships between the two groups have produced new security 
implications for the region. This evolution is no more evident than in August 2017 when the two 
groups conducted a joint operation that killed over 50 people in northern Afghanistan. This 
cooperation is partially the result of the growing inter-ethnic ties between the two groups. 
Increasing numbers of Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks are joining ISKP, many of whom have 
military experience fighting in Iraq and Syria.96 Aside from ethnic similarities, the two groups 
are also bound by the same ideology: “Despite internal contradictions and temporary conflicts 
for leadership in the jihadist world, al Qaeda, the Taliban and ISIS united by the common 
extremist Salafist-takfiri ideology. The purpose of this ideology is the construction of the 
Caliphate in the world and the struggle with the crusaders of the West.” Though currently at odds 
with each other, such similarities in both physical and ideological capital leaves room for 
increased cooperation between the two groups.97 
 Tajik membership in ISKP is growing due to the ethnic groups’ involvement in ISIS’s 
war in Iraq and Syria. The Tajik government estimates almost 1,500 of its citizens have gone to 
fight for ISIS in Iraq and Syria since 2011.98 The Tajik government has arrested hundreds of its 
citizens who either returned from fighting in Syria, have attempted to join the fighting, or in 
some way are affiliated with those who are. This number has increased, as recent ISIS defeats in 
Iraq and Syria has seen significant numbers of Tajik fighters return home. Such arrests have been 
made also due to the emerging threat of home-grown terrorism in the country. This threat came 
to fruition in July of 2018, when a group of foreign tourists were killed in Tajikistan. Those 
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responsible for the attack were Tajiks who had pledged allegiance to ISIS, demonstrating that 
grassroots terror movements have begun to form in the country. This attack is notable because it 
demonstrates a group that had no material support from ISIS, but were simply inspired by the 
terror group. This mirrors grassroots terror cells in other parts of the world and evidences the 
efficacy of online ISIS recruitment and propaganda that has been targeting Tajiks over the last 
seven years.99  
Discussion of Variable Ratings  
Variable 1: Energy Resources 
 There exists a clear distinction between the significance of local and proximate energy 
resources and infrastructure in and near Gorno-Badakhshan. For variable 1, a rating of “medium” 
was assigned based both on existing resource development and potential resource development. 
If no future development was planned, or if the region didn’t hold over 2% of all hydroelectric 
power potential globally, it would have received a “low” rating. This water resource is also the 
sole source of power in the territory, and supplies electricity to almost 300,000 people. However, 
because this potential is near impossible to fully tap, and its value (for now) is almost exclusively 
for local customers, it cannot receive a “high” rating. The question of this study examines the 
effects on regional (including proximate) energy security, not just local energy security. Because 
the water resources of GBAO are almost exclusively being used within its borders, and only 
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Variable 2: Energy Infrastructure 
 This distinction between local and proximate extends to energy infrastructure, and 
informs the rating of Variable 2 along the same lines of reasoning as Variable 1. Variable 2: 
Energy Infrastructure also receives a rating of “medium,” as it is pulled by local and proximate 
values. Within GBAO’s borders, the local energy infrastructure is similar in value to Variable 1 
in that it almost exclusively serves GBAO’s population. With exception to planned 
developments that would export hydroelectricity to communities in Afghan Badakhshan, almost 
all energy infrastructure in GBAO does not have transnational or proximate significance. 
Conversely, energy infrastructure projects, both established and under development, that are 
located in close proximity to GBAO are regionally significant. Lying to GBAO’s east, west, and 
north are either massive infrastructure developments or regions of current and continuing energy 
significance. Line-D of the China-Turkmen gas pipeline and the CASA-1000, as well as the 
proposed Kashgar-Gwadar pipeline all run within 25 miles of GBAO’s borders. These 
developments are crucial pieces in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and a particular focus of 
Chinese security concerns in the region. Line-D brings Central Asian LNG across 4 Central 
Asian countries, and the Kashgar-Gwadar line could equip China with the energy access and 
availability necessary to become even more of an influence in the region. Considering the local 
energy infrastructure rating would earn a “low” and its proximate counterpart would earn a 
“high,” the overall rating for Variable to is a “medium.” 
Variable 3: Ethnic, Religious, and Social Tension 
 The third variable, “Ethnic, Religious, and Social Tension,” receives a score of 
“medium/low” because while the Tajik government maintains a strained relationship with 
GBAO’s population, such strains are more political in nature than along ethnic, religious, or 
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social lines. Still, there exists ethnic and religious discrimination of the GBAO’s Pamiri people, 
and an effort by the Tajik government to crack down on any expression of these identities that it 
feels subversive to government control. However, the focus of the Tajik government’s ethnic and 
religious crackdowns is increasingly on ethnic Tajiks and religious Sunnis, not Pamiri Ismaelis. 
Because Shia Ismailism is a relatively progressive sect of Islam, and does not produce the same 
movements of Islamic extremism as certain Sunni schools of thought do, the Tajik government is 
more concerned with Sunni extremism than apparently absent Shia extremism.  
 Another antidote to this form of tension is how divided Pamiri and Tajik communities are 
geographically. While there exist both ethnic groups in all parts of the country, the 
overwhelming majority of Pamiris live in GBAO while this same majority of Tajiks live in the 
western provinces of the countries. GBAO’s isolation means there is often limited interaction 
between these two ethnic groups. This is unique in a region that has, and is, susceptible to ethnic 
violence. The Fergana Valley, for example, is home to numerous communities of differing 
Central Asian ethnicities, often occupying the same cities or agricultural land. Limited separation 
in these cases has led to continual ethnic clashes, violence that is conversely rare between Tajiks 
and Pamiris. The one social strain that is significant in GBAO is unemployment, which has 
forced many into leaving the province to find work in other countries. Unemployment is almost 
always linked to social unrest, which is of major concern in an already politically unstable 
region. Still, because efforts of ethnic and religious discrimination are being focused more on 
ethnic Tajiks, and movements of religious extremism are difficult to take hold among GBAO’s 
Pamiri population, such concerns are overshadowed by politically-motivated tensions. This 
variable earns a rating of “medium/low” because while there exists ethnic, religious, and social 
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tension in GBAO, these factors do not bear the same significance as others in determining the 
chance for political upheaval in the region.  
Variable 4: Regional Leadership and Power Structures    
 Gorno-Badakhshan’s political history over the last thirty years, as well as its current 
political leadership, represent the greatest sources of political tension between GBAO and the 
Tajik government. For this reason, Variable 4: Regional Leadership and Power Structures earns a 
rating of “high.” The Tajik Civil War, despite reaching an official end over twenty years ago, 
still influences how the Tajik government understands and prioritizes security concerns in the 
country. GBAO’s role as a rebel stronghold during the civil war continues today, with several 
former UTO commanders still maintaining informal militias and political influence over regional 
affairs. This tension between the Authorities and the Tajik government is furthered by general, 
albeit often skeptical, support from GBAO’s population. The other major leader in GBAO is The 
Aga Khan, who’s development agency has almost singlehandedly sustained the province’s 
Pamiri population. Pouring millions of dollars into health, energy, and infrastructure projects 
over the last four decades, this single religious leader holds more influence over GBAO than 
does the Tajik government. While the Aga Khan and the Tajik government maintain a more 
functional relationship than between the government and the Authorities, Dushanbe still 
maintains a high level of skepticism regarding the foreign leader’s influence and development 
programs. Because GBAO is functionally ruled by two primary leadership entities that do not 
include the Tajik government, the significance of “Regional Leadership and Power Structures” in 





Variable 5: Actualized Political Conflict 
  The fifth variable, Actualized Political Conflict, receives a rating of “medium/high” due 
to how instances of politically motivated violence have evolved since the end of the Tajik Civil 
War. While events of politically motivated violence have happened continually since the war’s 
official end in 1997, such events have increased in both intensity and frequency over the last 
eight years when compared to the previous decade. Hundreds of government troops and 
separatists have been killed in such conflicts, which have spanned both GBAO and neighboring 
provinces. Instances like the one-day battle in Khorog in 2012 have proven that separatists are 
capable of contesting, and even defeating, government forces in combat. This was the largest 
violent conflict since the Tajik Civil War and ended in a government retreat. The rating of 
“medium/high” is given because while instances of political violence have increased in 
frequency and intensity over the last twenty-five years, they are not continuously happening. 
Years have separated these events, but they remain a grave reminder to the Tajik government of 
actualized separatist power in the country.  
Variable 6: Vulnerability to Foreign-borne Extremism/Violence 
 Variable 6, “Vulnerability to Foreign-borne Extremism/Violence,” is comprised of four 
key factors.  The first two are kinds of vulnerabilities, which can be broadly understood as 
physical and non-physical. Physical vulnerability includes extremist groups physically crossing 
borders, and non-physical vulnerability includes the spread and adoption of extremist ideology 
via avenues like the internet. These two forms of vulnerability must then be examined in the 
context of GBAO and Tajikistan as a whole.  
 GBAO is far less vulnerable to non-physical extremist threats than the rest of Tajikistan. 
This resistance is rooted in the population of GBAO being almost entirely ethnically Pamiri and 
39 
 
religiously Shia Ismaeli. Groups like IMU, ISKP, and the Taliban, conversely, are religiously 
Sunni. Though the Taliban is increasingly made up of fighters from varying ethnicities and 
origins, only an extreme few are Pamiri Ismaelis. The Taliban and Pamiri communities routinely 
fight in Afghan Badakhshan, and cross-border skirmishes occasionally break out between the 
Taliban and Pamiris in GBAO. This difference in religion also means recruitment efforts by 
Sunni militant groups would obviously not be effective in gaining Pamiri supporters. Physically, 
GBAO is vulnerable to extremist groups in Afghanistan. The province shares a near 1,000 km. 
border with Afghanistan, much of which is unguarded. The only barrier to free movement across 
this border is the Panj River which acts as a physical separation between the two countries. This 
river is nearly impassable for at least half of the year, with heavy snowmelt causing powerful 
rapids along its length. This physical barrier is effective at limiting extremist infiltrations into 
GBAO, but small groups of determined militants have historically overcome such an obstacle.  
 Western Tajikistan (the rest of the country) is vulnerable to both physical and non-
physical threats from militant groups in Afghanistan. This non-physical vulnerability and 
susceptibility to extremist recruitment efforts rests on this region’s ethnic and religious 
demography. Unlike the Pamiris in GBAO, western Tajikistan’s population is comprised 
primarily of ethnic Tajiks who are religiously Sunni. Adherence to Sunni Islam makes Sunni 
extremist ideology pushed by groups like ISIS, ISKP, IMU, JA, and IJU, more effective and 
supported. These groups are also all increasingly comprised of ethnic Tajik fighters. As 
discussed in the data section of this variable, ethnic Tajiks are increasingly holding positions of 
power in these organizations in Afghanistan, leading to growth in cross-border connections, 
relationships, and sponsors between Tajiks in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. ISIS has also 
successfully inspired its first home-grown terror attack in Tajikistan in July of this year, proving 
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propaganda campaigns aimed at Tajik youth have been successful. This online recruitment has 
been exacerbated by Tajik fighters returning to Tajikistan from Syria and Iraq after fighting for 
ISIS. Not only are these fighters returning with extremist ideologies and relationships, they are 
bringing back combat experience and practical knowledge regarding terrorist and insurgent 
tactics. 
  Physically, western Tajikistan also shares a long border with northern Afghanistan, albeit 
a more defended one than GBAO’s. Still, physical proximity to northern Afghanistan, and 
increasing cross-border skirmishes between the Tajik military and Afghan extremist groups, 
demonstrate a growing vulnerability. This vulnerability is compounded with the changing ethnic 
diversity of the Taliban and previously mentioned extremist groups, as many groups’ foci have 
historically been on their countries of origin. The IMU, JA, and TIP, while currently fighting and 
training in Afghanistan, ultimately strive to bring their fights back to China, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. Western Tajikistan and GBAO serve as ideal territories to launch such operations, 
making these two regions strategically significant for extremist operations throughout Central 
Asia. 
 Though all these factors paint a grim picture for Tajik security, the variable does not 
receive a rating of “high” because GBAO’s population is not susceptible to the same strains of 
extremism found in western Tajikistan, and instead actively fights Afghan-based threats. The 
Afghan-Tajik border is also become increasingly militarized, with China, Russia, and the Tajik 
government increasing troop presence along its length. Though this may be counterintuitive, as 
will be discussed later, such presence will combat attempted incursions of fighters into the 
country. Still, the variable earns a rating of “medium/high” because there still exists relatively 
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high threats from Afghan-based extremist groups. Such threats rest primarily on growing 
populations and strength of such groups, and increasing inclusion of Tajik and Uzbek fighters.   
Discussion and Possible Scenarios 
 To ground and contextualized these 6 variables, it is important to supplement their 
discussions through an exploration of possible security scenarios. Many of these scenarios center 
on the Tajik government getting drawn into another confrontation with GBAO’s Authorities. 
Such a confrontation, be it a single event or long-term campaign, could leave room for other 
separatist/militant groups in the west of the country to take advantage of such shifts in 
government security foci and operations. As demonstrated by 2010 events in Rasht Valley, and 
2015 defection and attacks by high-ranking Tajik government officials, there exists ever-present 
hostilities and subversive groups throughout the country, and not just in GBAO. If the Tajik 
government began a military operation in GBAO today, it would be more devastating than 
2012’s battle in Khorog. The Authorities, having won that battle, are better equipped and 
motivated than ever in contesting the Tajik government. Such a battle would not last a single day 
like it did in 2012, but could potentially turn into a drawn-out conflict. Such a conflict would 
then present ample opportunities for not only domestic separatist groups to exercise power, but 
also Afghan-based militant groups. These foreign groups could carry out incursions into, and 
through, Tajikistan previously not possible with a more stable domestic security environment. 
Instability in GBAO, and subsequent government action in the territory, might allow previously 
impossible operations into Tajikistan and greater Central Asia by these militant organizations.  
 One impetus for renewed conflict in GBAO rests on the upcoming Tajik presidential 
transition. This transition will see Emomali Rahmon transfer power to his son, a transition that 
may offer a room for separatists and political opponents (both in GBAO and in the rest of 
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Tajikistan) move to gain or exert power. Such opponents may use the inherent instability of a 
political transition to challenge the government's control across different sectors, especially in 
GBAO where the Tajik government’s control is already strained. The presidential transition may 
also see action spawned from Rahmon’s son, who may attempt to establish himself as a strong 
and legitimate leader by cracking down on any dissent, real or perceived. This may include 
challenging the GBAO’s Authorities to further Dushanbe’s grip over the territory, especially 
now with rising Chinese presence and cooperation in GBAO. Regardless of who initiates 
upheaval, the upcoming presidential transition has the potential to spark political conflict 
throughout the country, and not just in GBAO. 
 If such upheaval were to occur, GBAO’s reliance on the Aga Khan Development 
Foundation would be the greatest hindrance to maintaining and rebuilding its energy 
infrastructure. GBAO’s entire electrical grid, all 9 hydroelectric and 13 electrical substations, 
and all future development is almost exclusively under the control of this single entity. The 
AKDF is already met with skepticism and hostility by the Tajik government and although the 
foundation has been permitted to develop electricity for GBAO’s population, a conflict in the 
region would see the organization barred from all activity in it. Without the help of the Aga Khan 
Foundation, residents of GBAO lack the equipment or expertise necessary to fix or re-build this 
infrastructure, which would be undoubtedly damaged if conflict were to occur. As demonstrated 
after the barring of the AKDF after the 2012 Khorog battle, a conflict, even when resolved, 
would likely see the Tajik government not permitting the AKDF to rebuild GBAO’s energy 
infrastructure.  
 While political upheaval in GBAO would be detrimental to the territory’s energy 
infrastructure and security, the energy infrastructure proximate to GBAO would face greater 
43 
 
threats. This would be initiated by conflict in GBAO, but perpetrated militant groups in western 
Tajikistan and Northern Afghanistan. A conflict in GBAO, especially a large one during the 
presidential transition, would strain the attention and military resources of the Tajik government. 
Groups like the IMU, who’s original stated purpose was to overthrow the governments of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, could more readily launch operations into the two countries. The 
Fergana and Rasht Valleys, two of IMU’s historical strongholds, lay less than 100 miles from 
northern Afghanistan, Rasht Valley running less than 25 miles from the Afghan border.  
 Threats to regional energy infrastructure north and east of GBAO rest on the growing 
Uyghur populations of the Taliban and IMU, as well as the swelling strength and numbers of the 
TIP. Political upheaval in Tajikistan might offer Uyghur militants opportunities to attack Chinese 
infrastructure proximate to GBAO, namely the Kashgar-Gwadar and Turkmen-China pipelines. 
Uyghur militants have historically attacked Chinese energy infrastructure in Xinjiang100, and 
conducted terrorist operations against Chinese civilians and government officials. These attacks 
have been used by the Chinese government as justification for recent mass-detentions of 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang, a move that could increase retaliation from Uyghur-aligned terror groups in 
Afghanistan. Uyghur militants receive support, and hold membership in, al-Qaeda, ISIS, IMU, 
and the Taliban. Recent gains by militants in northern Afghanistan has Chinese officials worried 
that these groups will begin launching attacks in Xinjiang, a key reason for increased Chinese 
military presence in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.101  
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 Another threat to Chinese energy infrastructure is the increasing number of ethnic 
Balochs joining the ranks of these various extremist groups. Baloch militants have mounted an 
insurgency against Pakistani forces for decades, and a favorite tactic of these insurgent groups is 
attacking the energy infrastructure of southern Pakistan. Between 2005 and 2018, Baloch 
insurgents have conducted 232 attacks against gas pipeline alone.102 With swelling numbers of 
Balochs joining the militant groups of northern Afghanistan, knowledge, tactics, and strategy 
related to energy infrastructure-focused attacks will spread to these growing organizations. As 
China increases its military presence in the region, Uyghur militants might turn to attacking 
Chinese energy infrastructure in other countries instead of within an increasingly-defended 
China. The Fergana Valley is an obvious target for such attacks, for its historical support of 
extremist groups, and it being home to the proposed Turkmen-China gas pipeline and CASA-
1000 transmission line.  
Conclusion 
Political separatism in Gorno-Badakhshan poses a “medium” level (2.3 numerical value) of 
threat against Central Asian energy security. This rating was determined by adding the numerical 
values of all 6 variables, and then determining their average (2+2+1.5+3+2.5+3*0.5=2.3). This 
level could be most potentially actualized through two possible scenarios: political 
violence/upheaval in GBAO would (1) pull Tajik security forces into a drawn-out conflict in the 
territory, potentially leaving room for militants in western Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan to 
launch attacks on energy infrastructure in and near Tajikistan and (2), hinder the maintenance 
and future development of energy infrastructure within, and proximate to, GBAO’s borders. The 
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significance of energy resources and infrastructure within, and proximate to, GBAO’s borders, 
coupled with the probability of political upheaval in the territory, all contribute to the 
justification of this level. Such unrest specifically hinges on upcoming political transitions within 
Tajikistan, and the potential for various groups to leverage the inherent instability associated 
with shifts in state control.  Implications for this conclusion are of particular concern for China, 
as the country has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in energy infrastructure projects to the 
north, east, and west of GBAO. Unrest in GBAO and in northern Afghanistan affect China’s 
ability to develop its western province of Xinjiang, and the numerous current and proposed 
projects in Central Asia that are part of its Belt and Road Initiative.  
 Ultimately, unrest in GBAO, and its associated effects on regional energy security, will 
draw in more powers than those just within Tajikistan. China and Russia, as well as other Central 
Asian republics, are all affected by threats and unrest in this strategic corner of the region. A 
conflict between the Tajik government and GBAO’s Authorities would not remain a local one, 
and emergence of actualized violence between the two groups would constitute widespread 
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